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Abstract
There has been recent interest in collaborative multi-agent bandits, where groups of
agents share recommendations to decrease per-agent regret. However, these works
assume that each agent always recommends their individual best-arm estimates
to other agents, which is unrealistic in envisioned applications (machine faults in
distributed computing or spam in social recommendation systems). Hence, we
generalize the setting to include honest and malicious agents who recommend
best-arm estimates and arbitrary arms, respectively. We show that even with a
single malicious agent, existing collaboration-based algorithms fail to improve
regret guarantees over a single-agent baseline. We propose a scheme where honest
agents learn who is malicious and dynamically reduce communication with them,
i.e., “blacklist” them. We show that collaboration indeed decreases regret for this
algorithm, when the number of malicious agents is small compared to the number
of arms, and crucially without assumptions on the malicious agents’ behavior.
Thus, our algorithm is robust against any malicious recommendation strategy.
1 Introduction
Multi-armed bandits (MABs) are classical models for online learning and decision making. In this
paper, we consider a setting where a group of agents collaborates to solve a stochastic MAB. More
precisely, agents face separate instances of the same MAB and communicate (in a bandwidth-limited
fashion) to collaboratively reduce per-agent regret. As motivation, we describe two applications:
1. Consider a search engine that displays ads alongside search results, and suppose search requests
are processed by a large number of machines/agents. In particular, each machine processes a
subset of requests and must decide which ad to display (to maximize, for example, the click-
through rate). Here the decision problem is naturally modeled as a MAB (with ads as arms), and
the machines can collaborate by exchanging information, subject to bandwidth constraints.
2. Consider an online recommendation system, e.g., for restaurants. Each user/agent can decide
which restaurant to visit based on their past dining experiences, which again can be modeled as
a MAB (with restaurants as arms). However, they can also collaborate by writing and reading
reviews. Here two users “communicate” if one reads the other’s review, and the bandwidth
constraint arises since each user likely reads a small fraction of all reviews.
In such applications, it is infeasible (or at least inefficient) for a single agent to explore all arms.
Hence, several algorithms have been proposed in which each agent explores a small subset of active
arms and occasionally recommends an estimate of their best active arm to another agent [12; 26].
This allows the true best arm to eventually spread to all agents’ active sets, while reducing the number
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of suboptimal arms each agent must explore, thereby decreasing regret. However, these algorithms
require all agents to truthfully report best-arm estimates, which does not occur in practice. For
example, spam reviews can be modeled as bad arm recommendations in the restaurant application; in
the search application, machines will occasionally fail and stop communicating altogether.
In light of this, we study a more realistic setting in which n honest agents recommend best-arm
estimates and m malicious agents recommend arbitrary arms. Our contributions are as follows:
1. We show the algorithm from [12] (the state-of-the-art in the case m = 0) fails in this generalized
setting, in the sense that even a single malicious agent negates the benefit of collaboration. More
precisely, we prove that for any m ∈ N, honest agents incur Ω(K log(T )/∆) regret (where K
is the number of arms, T is the horizon, and ∆ is the arm gap), identical in an order sense to
what they experience if each plays the MAB in isolation. (See Theorem 1, Remark 1.)
2. Owing to the failure of [12] in the generalized setting, we propose an algorithm using a simple
idea called blacklisting, roughly defined as follows: if an agent recommends an arm at time
t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and this arm performs poorly, ignore or “blacklist” the recommending agent
until time t2. These increasing blacklist periods t2 balance two competing forces. First, honest
agents who mistakenly recommend bad arms at small t (which occurs for t = o(∆−2) [2]) are
not ignored for too long, so they can later help spread the best arm among honest agents. Second,
malicious agents who repeatedly recommend bad arms are punished with increasing severity (a
bad recommendation at t blacklists them until t2, then until t4, then until t8, etc.), which reduces
the number of bad arms they can force honest agents to explore. (See Remarks 3, 7.)
3. For the proposed algorithm, we upper bound regret by O((m + K/n) log(T )/∆). Thus, our
algorithm is robust against malicious agents, in the sense that collaboration remains beneficial
if m is small compared to K. More precisely, the multiplicative constant in our upper bound
is min{m+K/n,K}, i.e., for large m we also recover the O(K log(T )/∆) regret that honest
agents experience in isolation. (See Theorem 2, Remark 6.)
4. Our analysis makes no assumption on the behavior of malicious agents, i.e., on how they
recommend arms (besides a mild measurability condition). This is critical because the definition
of “malicious” is highly domain-dependent (consider the aforementioned spam review and
faulty machine applications).1 For example, our algorithm is robust against groups of malicious
agents who collude, “omniscient" malicious agents who observe and exploit the arm pulls and
rewards of all honest agents, “deceitful" malicious agents who initially report good arms to build
credibility but later abuse this credibility by reporting bad arms, and combinations thereof.
5. Analytically, our paper is the first in the collaborative multi-agent stochastic MAB literature to
treat non-monotone active arm sets that change infinitely often. Namely, honest agents in our
algorithm discard poorly-performing active arms in favor of recommendations (in contrast to
[26], where active sets grow monotonically), infinitely many times as T →∞ (in contrast to
[12], where the sets are fixed after some almost-surely finite time). (See Remark 8.)
We note our approach of increasing blacklist periods is similar in spirit to the content moderation
policies of several online platforms. For example, Stack Exchange suggests suspensions of 7, 30,
and 365 days for successive rule violations [29], while Wikipedia blocks users “longer for persistent
violations” [31]. Thus, our paper provides a formal model and a rigorous analysis of such policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin with preliminaries in Section 2. In
Section 3, we define a general algorithm for multi-agent MABs. Sections 4 and 5 analyze two special
cases of this algorithm: the one from [12] and the proposed algorithm. In Section 6, we illustrate our
theoretical results with experiments. We discuss related work in Section 7 and close in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a stochastic MAB with arms 1, . . . ,K. Arm k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} generates Bernoulli(µk)
rewards for some µk ∈ (0, 1), independent across agents and across successive pulls of the arm. We
assume the arms are labeled such that µ1 ≥ · · · ≥ µK . We call 1 the best arm and assume it is
1“Malicious" is something of a misnomer when discussing unintentional failures like faulty machines; we
use this word to emphasize that our algorithm is robust against worst-case behavior of such agents.
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unique, i.e., µ1 > µ2. For each arm k, we let ∆k = µ1 − µk ∈ (0, 1) denote the k-th arm gap, i.e.,
the difference in means of the best arm and arm k.
Our multi-agent system contains n + m total agents (n,m ∈ N), divided into two types. Agents
1, . . . , n, called honest agents, collaborate (by running a prescribed algorithm) to minimize their
individual cumulative regret. More specifically, each honest agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} faces a separate
instance of the K-armed bandit problem defined above and aims to minimize
ER(i)T =
T∑
t=1
E(µ1 − µI(i)t ) =
T∑
t=1
E∆
I
(i)
t
,
where T ∈ N is a time horizon unknown to i and I(i)t ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is the arm that i pulls at time t.
Here and moving forward, all random variables are defined on a common probability space (Ω,F ,P).
In contrast to honest agents, agents n+ 1, . . . , n+m need not run the prescribed algorithm. We call
them malicious agents and formally define their behavior in Section 3. Of course, honest agents do
not know who is honest and who is malicious; we make no such assumption on malicious agents.
3 General algorithm
We next describe a regret minimization scheme for multi-agent MABs with blacklists, defined from
the perspective of honest agent i in Algorithm 1 (we assume all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} locally execute the
algorithm). Time is discrete and indexed by t, where (as above) i pulls arm I(i)t at each t ∈ N. During
certain time slots Aj ∈ N, called communication epochs, i contacts an agent not belonging to a
blacklist P (i)j ⊂ {1, . . . , n+m}.2 The algorithm from [12] is the special case where P (i)j = ∅ ∀ i, j,
i.e., where no blacklisting occurs. In contrast, our algorithm modifies these blacklists at each epoch
using subroutine Update-Blacklists (Line 7 of Algorithm 1), which we define in Section 5. For
now, we outline Algorithm 1 as a general approach encompassing both algorithms.
Initialization: i begins by initializing communication epochs Aj = jβ , where β > 1 is an input to
the algorithm. Moving forward, we call the period between timesAj−1 +1 andAj (inclusive) the j-th
phase. Line 1 also initializes the blacklists to empty sets (i is a priori willing to communicate with
anyone). In Line 2, i initializes the current phase j = 1 and a subset of arms S(i)j = Sˆ
(i)∪{U (i)j , L(i)j },
where Sˆ(i) ⊂ {1, . . . ,K} is an input satisfying |Sˆ(i)| = S for some S not depending on i.
Pulling active arms: At t ∈ {Aj−1 + 1, . . . , Aj}, i pulls arm I(i)t ∈ S(i)j that maximizes the
UCB(α) index [4; 8], where α > 0 is an input to the algorithm, and µˆ(i)k (t− 1) and T (i)k (t− 1) are
the average reward and number of plays of arm k for agent i before time t. Note i only pulls arms
from S(i)j during phase j; thus, we call S
(i)
j the active set and its elements active arms.
Updating active arms: At epochAj , i records a best-arm estimate (quantified as its most played arm
in the current phase, Line 6), calls the aforementioned Update-Blacklists subroutine (in the case
of our algorithm, Line 7), and solicits an arm recommendation (Line 8, to be discussed shortly). If
this recommendation is not active, i adds it to the active set and discards the arm from S(i)j \ Sˆ(i) that
was played least in phase j (Lines 9-14). Note the active set always includes Sˆ(i); we thus call these
arms sticky (as in [12]). However, the active set as a whole varies with j; the hope is that 1 ∈ S(i)j ∀ i
eventually (i.e., eventually the best arm spreads and honest agents begin enjoying sublinear regret).
Arm recommendations: We model pairwise communication using Algorithm 2, which proceeds as
follows. A random non-blacklisted agent is chosen (Line 1 of Algorithm 2). If this agent is honest, it
recommends its current best-arm estimate (i.e., its most played arm in the current phase); if malicious,
it recommends an arbitrary arm (Lines 2-3). Note Algorithm 2 is “black-boxed”, i.e., i provides
inputs i, j, P (i)j and observes outputs H
(i)
j , R
(i)
j , but does not locally execute Algorithm 2.
Malicious agent behavior: More precisely, if i contacts malicious agent i′ at phase j, i receives
a random arm distributed as ν(i
′)
j,i , where ν
(i′)
j,i is any F-measurable mapping from Ω to the set of
probability distributions over {1, . . . ,K} (i.e., ν(i′)j,i is a random distribution over arms). Besides this
2We use blacklist as both a verb and a noun: blacklisting and adding to a blacklist are synonymous.
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measurability condition (which ensures expected regret is well-defined), we make no assumptions on
malicious agent behavior. Note this permits the case where malicious agents run Algorithm 1 and
recommend best-arm estimates, i.e., where they behave as honest agents. Moving forward, we call
{ν(i′)j,i }j∈N,i∈{1,...,n} the strategy of malicious agent i′.
Algorithm 1: Multi-Agent-MAB-With-Blacklists(α, β, Sˆ(i)) (executed by i)
Input: UCB exploration parameter α > 0, phase duration parameter β > 1, sticky set
Sˆ(i) ⊂ {1, . . . ,K} with |Sˆ(i)| = S ≤ K − 2
1 Initialize Aj′ = d(j′)βe, P (i)j′ = ∅ ∀ j′ ∈ N
2 Set j = 1, let U (i)j , L
(i)
j be distinct elements of {1, . . . ,K} \ Sˆ(i), set S(i)j = Sˆ(i) ∪ {U (i)j , L(i)j }
3 for t ∈ N do
4 Pull I(i)t ∈ arg maxk∈S(i)j µˆ
(i)
k (t− 1) +
√
α log(t)/T
(i)
k (t− 1)
5 if t = Aj then
6 B
(i)
j = arg maxk∈S(i)j
T
(i)
k (Aj)− T (i)k (Aj−1) (most played in this phase)
7 {P (i)j′ }∞j′=j ← Update-Blacklist({P (i)j′ }∞j′=j) (algorithm from [12] performs no update;
proposed algorithm uses Algorithm 3)
8 (H
(i)
j , R
(i)
j ) = Get-Recommendation(i, j, P
(i)
j ) (Algorithm 2)
9 U
(i)
j+1 = arg maxk∈{U(i)j ,L(i)j }
T
(i)
k (Aj)− T (i)k (Aj−1) (most played non-sticky)
10 if R(i)j /∈ S(i)j then L(i)j+1 = R(i)j (replace least played non-sticky);
11 else L(i)j+1 =
{
L
(i)
j , U
(i)
j+1 = U
(i)
j
U
(i)
j , U
(i)
j+1 = L
(i)
j
(keep least played non-sticky);
12 S
(i)
j+1 = Sˆ
(i) ∪ {U (i)j+1, L(i)j+1} (active arms for next phase), j ← j + 1 (increment phase)
13 end
14 end
Algorithm 2: (H(i)j , R
(i)
j ) = Get-Recommendation(i, j, P
(i)
j ) (black box to i)
Input: Agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, phase j ∈ N, blacklist P (i)j
1 Choose H(i)j from {1, . . . , n+m} \ (P (i)j ∪ {i}) uniformly at random
2 if H(i)j ≤ n then R(i)j = B
(H
(i)
j )
j (honest agents recommended most played in phase j) ;
3 else Sample R(i)j from ν
(H
(i)
j )
j,i (where, for each i
′ > n, ν(i
′)
j,i is any F-measurable mapping from Ω
to the set of probability distributions over {1, . . . ,K}) ;
Return: (H(i)j , R
(i)
j )
4 Existing algorithm and a lower bound
The existing algorithm from [12] is the special case of Algorithm 1 where no blacklisting occurs,
i.e., where P (i)j = ∅ ∀ j ∈ N, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.3 Thus, honest agent i contacts an agent sampled
uniformly from {1, . . . , n + m} \ {i} at each epoch. The following theorem lower bounds regret
for this algorithm in the case of a single malicious agent (m = 1). Note the lone malicious agent
has index n + 1 in this case. Also note we should not expect a nontrivial lower bound for any
strategy {ν(n+1)j,i }j∈N,i∈{1,...,n}, because (as discussed in Section 3) the malicious agent may behave
as an honest agent, reducing the system to the setting of [12], for which regret is upper bounded
3More precisely, we mean the synchronous algorithm in [12], which also includes an asynchronous variant
where phase lengths are continuous random variables. For simplicity, we restrict attention to the former.
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by O(S log(T )/∆2) (see [12, Theorem 1]). Hence, in Theorem 1, we consider an explicit strategy,
where the malicious agent recommends uniformly random arms. Along these lines, note the theorem
immediately extends to m ∈ {2, 3, . . .}, since we can assume m − 1 malicious agents behave as
honest ones, reducing the system to the setting of the theorem (with n replaced by n+m− 1).
Theorem 1. Assume m = 1 and let ν(n+1)j,i be the uniform distribution over {1, . . . ,K}, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ N. Suppose each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} runs Algorithm 1 with inputs α, β > 1 and
performs no update in Line 7 (i.e., i runs the algorithm from [12]). Also assume 1 ∈ ∪ni′=1Sˆ(i
′).
Then for any ε ∈ (0, 1) independent of T and any i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
lim
T→∞
P
(
R
(i)
T
log T
≥ (1− ε)α
(
1− 1√
α
)2 K∑
k=2
1
∆k
)
= 1,
and consequently,
lim inf
T→∞
ER(i)T
log T
≥ α
(
1− 1√
α
)2 K∑
k=2
1
∆k
.
Remark 1. As an example, if ∆1 = · · · = ∆K = ∆ for some ∆ ∈ (0, 1), honest agents who run
the algorithm from [12] incur Ω(K log(T )/∆) regret (with high probability and in expectation),
equivalent to the single-agent UCB(α) baseline from [4]. Thus, the algorithm from [12] fails when
a single malicious agent is present, in the sense that collaboration is no longer strictly beneficial.
Notably, this occurs independently of the number of honest agents n.
Remark 2. We assume 1 ∈ ∪ni′=1Sˆ(i
′) in Theorem 1 to remove the trivial case where this assumption
fails and agents incur Ω(T ) regret. Note that, although we treat {Sˆ(i′)}ni′=1 as deterministic,
an alternative approach is to define them as S-sized uniformly random subsets; choosing S =
d(K/n) log(1/ε)e ensures this assumption holds with probability 1− ε (see [12, Appendix L]).
Proof sketch. The proof of Theorem 1 is deferred to Appendix A, but we mention the key ideas here.
First, it suffices to consider the case where 1 ∈ S(i)j for all late phases j and 1 is played a constant
fraction of times during such phases (else, regret is polynomial in T and the result is immediate).
Second, for each honest agent i, phase j, and arm k, R(i)j = k with probability at least 1/(nK) (since
the malicious agent is contacted with probability 1/n and recommends uniformly). Taken together,
we can conclude for any T large, any honest agent i, and any arm k, there exists a phase j = Θ(T 1/β)
and a time t ≥ Aj−1 = Θ(T ) during this phase such that 1, k ∈ S(i)j , T (i)1 (t − 1) = Θ(T ), and
I
(i)
t = 1. Hence, by the UCB(α) policy (Line 4 of Algorithm 1), we must have
µˆ
(i)
k (t− 1) + Θ
(√
log(T )/T
(i)
k (t− 1)
)
≤ µˆ(i)1 (t− 1) + Θ
(√
log(T )/T
)
.
Thus, if µˆ(i)1 (t − 1) − µˆ(i)k (t − 1) ≈ µ1 − µk = ∆k (which holds with high probability), then
T
(i)
k (t− 1) = Ω(log(T )/∆2k), which means Ω(log(T )/∆k) regret incurred from arm k.
5 Proposed algorithm and upper bound
We next define our approach, which in words is quite simple: if agent i′ recommends arm k at epoch
j − 1, and k is not the most played arm in phase j, blacklist i′ until epoch jη, where η > 1 is a
tuning parameter. More precisely, we propose running Algorithm 1 with the Update-Blacklists
subroutine defined in Algorithm 3.
Remark 3. The key feature of Algorithm 3 is that the blacklisting period {j, . . . , djηe} grows with
j. As mentioned in the introduction, this ensures two things. First, malicious agents who repeatedly
recommend bad arms at late phases are blacklisted long enough to prevent the situation of the
Theorem 1 proof sketch (which causes Ω(K log(T )/∆) regret). Second, honest agents i′ who are
mistakenly blacklisted at early phases leave the blacklist soon enough to help spread the best arm
to other honest agents. Note such mistakes can happen for three reasons: (1) i′ has much worse
active arms than i, so any recommendation will perform poorly for i; (2) i′ has good active arms but
accidentally recommends a bad arm (which will occur before time Θ(∆−2) [2]); (3) i′ recommends
5
Algorithm 3: {P (i)j′ }∞j′=j = Update-Blacklists({P (i)j′ }∞j′=j) (executed by i)
1 if j > 1, B(i)j 6= R(i)j−1 (previous recommendation not most played) then
2 for j′ ∈ {j, . . . , djηe} do
3 P
(i)
j′ ← P (i)j′ ∪ {H(i)j−1} (blacklist the recommender)
4 end
5 end
Return: {P (i)j′ }∞j′=j
a good arm that performs poorly for i (which also occurs before Θ(∆−2)). See Theorem 2 proof
sketch and Remark 7 for a more quantitative discussion of these ideas.
Remark 4. At a high level, malicious agents introduce a dilemma analogous to the standard
MAB explore-exploit tradeoff: honest agents should blacklist those who provide seemingly-bad
recommendations – analogous to pulling seemingly-bad arms less frequently, i.e., exploiting – but
should blacklist mildly enough that honest mistakes are not punished too severely – analogous to
continued exploration of seemingly-bad arms. Thus, Remark 3 and our analysis show that Algorithm
3 provides the correct scaling (jη-length blacklisting) for this additional explore-exploit tradeoff.
Remark 5. We defined blacklists as infinite sequences to simplify the exposition; in practice, they can
be maintained with (m+ n) log T memory: i can initialize d(i)(i′) = 0 and overwrite d(i)(i′) with
djηe if i′ is blacklisted at phase j (for each i′), so that P (i)j = {i′ : d(i)(i′) ≥ j}. Note i requires
log T memory to store, e.g., rewards, so this does not increase i’s storage cost in terms of T .
Having defined our algorithm, we state a regret guarantee. We again assume 1 ∈ ∪ni′=1Sˆ(i
′) (see
Remark 2) but require no assumptions on the number of malicious agents or their strategies.
Theorem 2. Suppose each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} runs Algorithm 1 with inputs β > 1, α > 3+(1+βη)/β2
and uses Algorithm 3 as the Update-Blacklists subroutine with input η > 1. Also assume
1 ∈ ∪ni′=1Sˆ(i
′). Then for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any T ∈ N,
ER(i)T ≤ 4αmin
{
2η − 1
η − 1
m+3∑
k=2
1
∆k
+
S+m+4∑
k=m+4
1
∆k
,
K∑
k=2
1
∆k
}
log(T ) + CK,∆2,n,m,S,α,β,η,
where (by convention) ∆k = 1 ∀ k > K, and where CK,∆2,n,m,S,α,β,η is a constant independent of
T defined in (21) and satisfying
CK,∆2,n,m,S,α,β,η = O((S/∆
2
2)
2βη/(β−1) + SnK2 + ((m+ n) log n)β
+ (K/∆2) +m log(K/∆2)/∆2).
Remark 6. Letting S = d(K/n) log(1/)e (see Remark 2) and ∆1 = · · · = ∆K = ∆, Theorem 2
shows regret scales as O(min{m+K/n,K} log(T )/∆) for our algorithm. Thus, if the number of
malicious agents is small compared to the number of arms, honest agents benefit from collaboration.
In contrast, even m = 1 nullifies this benefit for the existing algorithm (see Remark 1).
Proof sketch. We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix B but here describe the key ideas in the case
∆1 = · · · = ∆K = ∆ and S +m < K. We first define a random phase τ such that
1 ∈ S(i)j , B(i)j = 1 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀ j ∈ {τ, τ + 1, . . .}, (1)
i.e., the best arm is active and most played for all honest agents i and all phases j ≥ τ (see (13) in
Appendix B). We then separate regret into three regimes defined in terms of τ :
1. Before phase τ (the early regime), we trivially bound regret by EAτ and show this is independent
of T . To do so, we first define a random phase τstab ≤ τ such that 1 ∈ S(i)j ⇒ B(i)j = 1 ∀ j ≥
τstab, i.e., the best arm is most played if it is active. Note that if 1 ∈ Sˆ(i∗) for some honest i∗, i
will never blacklist i∗ after phase τstab (since i∗ will recommend 1, which will then be most
played by i). Thus, in the worst case, i blacklists i∗ just before τstab. But then i un-blacklists i∗
6
at phase τηstab, contacts i
∗ after Θ(m+ n) additional phases, and receives the best arm. Hence,
showing EAτ < ∞ amounts to showing EAτηstab , Eτ
ηβ
stab < ∞. The latter inequality holds
because the growing phases Aj −Aj−1 = Θ(jβ−1) ensure that when j is large enough, the best
arm (if present) can be reliably identified [8]. We note the definition of τstab is taken from [12],
but our analysis differs as we require a stronger result (Eτηβstab <∞ instead of Eτβstab <∞ in
[12]) and must contend with malicious agents, whose recommendations can be arbitrary.
2. The late regime (LR) contains phases j ∈ {max{Tφ, τ}, . . . , T 1/β}, where φ ∈ (0, 1/β) will
be chosen later (independent of T ) and T 1/β is the phase ending at time AT 1/β , T . If
malicious i′ recommends k 6= 1 at such j, k will not be most played by (1), so i′ will be
blacklisted until jη . It follows that i′ can only recommend suboptimally at phases that scale as
{Tφηl}l∗l=0, where l∗ = − logη(βφ) indexes the last such phase (since Tφη
l∗
= T 1/β). Thus,
irrespective of T , each malicious agent can recommend only l∗ suboptimal arms in the LR. This
means i only explores S + l∗m suboptimal arms in the LR: S sticky arms and l∗m malicious
recommendations, since honest agents recommend 1 in the LR by (1). Thus, the LR is roughly
equivalent to an (S + l∗m)-armed bandit, which implies O((S + l∗m) log(T )/∆) regret [4].
3. The remaining phases τ, . . . , Tφ are the intermediate regime (IR). Similar to the LR, malicious i′
can only recommend suboptimally at phases {τηl}l, but there are infinitely many such phases in
the IR (roughly log log T of them, since τ <∞ a.s.). Hence, we concede malicious agents may
force i to explore all K − 1 suboptimal arms during this regime. However, by (1) and since t ≤
ATφ , Tφβ in the IR, this is no worse than playing all K arms for horizon Tφβ , which means
O(K log(Tφβ)/∆) IR regret – negligible compared to LR regret if we choose φ = 1/(Kβ).
Note this implies l∗ = O(logK) in the LR, which means O((S + m logK) log(T )/∆) LR
regret; in the actual proof, we argue more carefully to avoid the logK factor.
Remark 7. In short, our algorithm relies on three phenomena. First, for phases independent of T ,
polynomial-length blacklisting is mild enough that the best arm spreads (see item 1 in proof sketch).
Second, repeatedly blacklisting malicious agents means each recommends finite suboptimal arms
at phases polynomial in T (see 2). Third, while blacklisting cannot eliminate malicious agents in
between these regimes, the effective horizon T 1/K is too small to appreciably increase regret (see 3).
6 Experiments
In this section, we illustrate our analysis with numerical results on synthetic and real datasets.
Synthetic data: For the arm means, we choose µ1 = 0.95, µ2 = 0.85 (so that ∆2 = 0.1) and sample
µ3, . . . , µK from [0, 0.85] uniformly. We fix n = 25, β = 2, and α = 4. Note the existing algorithm
has good empirical performance with similar parameters when m = 0 (see [12, Section 7]). We
choose S = dK/ne (see Remark 2) and resample uniformly random sticky sets until 1 ∈ ∪ni=1Sˆ(i).
We consider two malicious agent strategies: a uniform strategy and an omniscient strategy, where
ν
(i′)
j,i is uniform over {1, . . . ,K} and arg mink′∈{2,...,K}\S(i)j T
(i)
k′ (Aj), respectively.
4 Note that the
omniscient strategy recommends whichever inactive suboptimal arm has been played least thus
far, which forces honest agents to continue exploring all suboptimal arms. In Figure 1, we set
m = 10,K = 100, η = 2 and plot mean and standard deviation of regret over 50 trials. We compare
the proposed algorithm to the existing one from [12], a baseline with no communication between
agents, and an oracle baseline where honest agents know and blacklist malicious agents a priori. Our
algorithm performs closer to the oracle than the no communication baseline; the opposite is true
for [12]. Moreover, our algorithm incurs less than half the regret of the existing algorithm. This
improvement occurs across various choices of m,K, η; see Appendix C.
Real data: For the same choices of n, β, α, and malicious agent strategy, we test the four algorithms
on the MovieLens dataset [13]. We view movies as arms and derive arm means in a manner similar
to [12; 26]. First, we extract a matrix containing movie ratings by users with the same age, gender,
and occupation, while also ensuring each user has rated ≥ 30 movies and each movie has been rated
≥ 30 times by the set of users. Next, we use matrix completion [14] to estimate the missing entries of
4Omniscient refers to the fact that malicious agents exploit private information T (i)k′ (Aj).
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Figure 1: Average regret for synthetic data, m = 10,K = 100, η = 2
Figure 2: Average regret for real data, m = 15,K = 100, η = 2
this matrix. From this estimated matrix, we map ratings to Bernoulli rewards by defining arm means
as the fraction of ratings ≥ 4 on a scale of 1 to 5 (i.e., we assume a user enjoyed a movie and gained
a unit reward if he/she rated it 4 or 5 stars). Figure 2 shows results similar to the synthetic case for
m = 15,K = 100, η = 2; Appendix C again contains results for other m,K, η values.
7 Related work
Multi-agent MABs with malicious agents were previously studied in [6] (there called dishonest
agents), but there are two fundamental differences between this work and ours. First, [6] considers
non-stochastic/adversarial MABs [3], in contrast to the stochastic MABs of our work. Second, [6]
assumes each agent communicates with all the others between each arm pull, while our algorithm has
O(T 1/β), β > 1 pairwise communications per T arm pulls (which models the bandwidth constraints
of the motivating applications discussed in Section 1). We also note multi-agent non-stochastic MABs
without malicious agents were studied in [10; 17; 27].
We are not aware of prior work studying multi-agent stochastic MABs with malicious agents and
bandwidth constraints (as our paper does). However, two papers consider m = 0 malicious agents
but have settings otherwise identical to ours: the aforementioned [12] and its predecessor [26]. The
reason we used [12] as a point of comparison throughout the paper is that [26] has two shortcomings
relative to [12]: agents need to know the arm gap ∆2 (which is unrealistic in applications), and the
regret guarantee is weaker than [12] when m = 0. Nevertheless, we note a lower bound can also be
established for the algorithm from [26] using the ideas of Theorem 1.
Multi-agent stochastic MABs without malicious agents have been considered in other papers, though
the settings are less similar to ours than [12; 26]. For example, [9; 11] allow broadcasts instead of
pairwise communication, [18; 24] allow communication at every time step instead of O(T 1/β) times
over horizon T , agents in [20] communicate arm mean estimates instead of arm indices (note the
former requires more bandwidth per transmission as T grows, while the latter requires logK bits
independent of T ), [15; 30] aim to minimize simple instead of cumulative regret, [19] considers
contextual MABs, and agents in [28] face MABs with different reward distributions.
A final line of work worth mentioning includes [1; 5; 7; 16; 21; 22; 23; 25]. Here the agents are
competitive, in the sense that rewards are smaller if several agents simultaneously pull an arm. This
stands in clear contrast to our work, where rewards are independent across honest agents.
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8 Conclusion
We studied a setting in which n honest agents collaborate to minimize regret from a K-armed bandit
and m malicious agents disrupt this collaboration. We showed that even ifm = 1, existing algorithms
fail to leverage the benefit of collaboration in this setting. We thus proposed an algorithm based on
blacklisting. For the proposed algorithm, we showed regret is smaller than the single-agent baseline
whenever m is small compared to K, ensuring robustness against any malicious behavior.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
The expected regret bound is a simple consequence of the high probability result. To prove the latter,
first define h(T ) = b(dT 1/βe − 1)/2c ∀ T ∈ N. Then h(T )→∞ as T →∞, so for T large,
2h(T ) ≥ h(T ) + 1 ≥ dT
1/βe − 1
2
≥ T
1/β
e
, 2h(T ) ≤ dT 1/βe − 1 ≤ T 1/β ,
which respectively imply
A2h(T ) = d(2h(T ))βe ≥ (2h(T ))β ≥ T
eβ
, A2h(T ) = d(2h(T ))βe ≤ T.
Consequently, for any δ > 0 and all T ≥ eβ/δ ,
R
(i)
T
log T
≥
R
(i)
A2h(T )
logA2h(T )
(
1− β
log T
)
≥
R
(i)
A2h(T )
logA2h(T )
(1− δ).
Thus, choosing δ small enough that (1− δ)2 ≥ (1− ε), it suffices to show
lim
T→∞
P
 R(i)A2h(T )
logA2h(T )
< (1− δ)α
(
1− 1√
α
)2 K∑
k=2
1
∆k
 = 0.
Equivalently (since h(T )→∞ as T →∞), we can show P(G(i)j∗ )→ 0 as j∗ →∞, where
G(i)j∗ =
 R
(i)
A2j∗
logA2j∗
< (1− δ)α
(
1− 1√
α
)2 K∑
k=2
1
∆k
 .
(In words, we have simply rewritten the result in terms of regret at the end of a phase, which will be
more convenient.) Thus, our goal is to show P(G(i)j∗ )→ 0. We first eliminate a trivial case where the
best arm is not played sufficiently often. Namely, we define the event
E(i)j∗ = {T
(i)
1 (Aj∗) > j
β
∗ /2} ∩ ∩2j∗j=j∗ ∪
Aj
t=1+Aj−1 {I
(i)
t = 1},
and we show G(i)j∗ \ E
(i)
j∗ = ∅ large j∗ (so it will only remain to show P(G
(i)
j∗ , E
(i)
j∗ )→ 0). First note
(E(i)j∗ )C = {T
(i)
1 (Aj∗) ≤ jβ∗ /2} ∪ ∪2j∗j=j∗{T
(i)
1 (Aj) = T
(i)
1 (Aj−1)}.
Now if T (i)1 (Aj∗) ≤ jβ∗ /2, then the number of pulls of suboptimal arms by A2j∗ satisfies
K∑
k=2
T
(i)
k (A2j∗) ≥
K∑
k=2
T
(i)
k (Aj∗) = Aj∗ − T (i)1 (Aj∗) = djβ∗ e − T (i)1 (Aj∗) ≥
jβ∗
2
≥ j
β−1
∗
2
,
where the first inequality is monotonicity of T (i)k (·) and the equalities are by definition. On the other
hand, if T (i)1 (Aj) = T
(i)
1 (Aj−1) for some j ∈ {j∗, . . . , 2j∗}, then
K∑
k=2
T
(i)
k (A2j∗) ≥ Aj −Aj−1 ≥ jβ − (j − 1)β − 1 ≥ β(j − 1)β−1 − 1 ≥
jβ−1∗
2
, (2)
where we again used the definition of Aj , along with the mean value theorem, and where the final in-
equality holds for j∗ large. Hence, by the basic regret decomposition R
(i)
A2j∗
=
∑K
k=2 ∆kT
(i)
k (A2j∗),
(E(i)j∗ )C ⇒ R
(i)
A2j∗
≥ ∆2
K∑
k=2
T
(i)
k (A2j∗) ≥
∆2j
β−1
∗
2
.
We have shown that R(i)A2j∗ grows polynomially in j∗ whenever E
(i)
j∗ fails (recall β > 1). On the other
hand, G(i)j∗ says R
(i)
A2j∗
is logarithmic in j∗. Thus, G(i)j∗ \ E
(i)
j∗ cannot occur for large j∗.
The remainder (and the bulk) of the proof involves showing P(G(i)j∗ , E
(i)
j∗ ) → 0. We begin with a
finite-time lower bound on the number of plays of any suboptimal arm when E(i)j∗ occurs.
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Lemma 1. Let α > 1, β > 1, k ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, and j∗ ∈ N ∩ [(2β + 1)1/β ,∞). Assume that for
some ζ > 0 and some λ ∈ (√1/α, 1),
√
α logAj∗
(
∆k(1− λ)√
ζα logA2j∗
− 2
√
2
j
β/2
∗
)
≥ ∆k. (3)
Then for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
P
(
T
(i)
k (A2j∗) <
ζα logA2j∗
∆2k
, E(i)j∗
)
≤ 2ζαβ log(j∗)j
2β(1−αλ2)
∗
∆2k(αλ
2 − 1) +
(
1− 1
nK
)j∗
. (4)
Proof. We first use the law of total probability and the union bound to write
P
(
T
(i)
k (A2j∗) <
ζα logA2j∗
∆2k
, E(i)j∗
)
≤
2j∗∑
j=j∗+1
P
(
T
(i)
k (A2j∗) <
ζα logA2j∗
∆2k
, E(i)j∗ , k ∈ S
(i)
j
)
(5)
+ P(k /∈ S(i)j ∀ j ∈ {j∗ + 1, . . . , 2j∗}). (6)
We will show (5) and (6) are bounded by the first and second summands in (4), respectively. We
begin with the easier step: bounding (6). Note (6) is zero for sticky arms k ∈ Sˆ(i), so we assume
k /∈ Sˆ(i). Then conditioned on k /∈ S(i)2j∗−1, k ∈ S
(i)
2j∗ ⇔ R
(i)
2j∗−1 = k (see Algorithm 1). Also,
since the malicious agent is contacted with probability 1/n at each epoch and recommends uniformly
random arms, R(i)2j∗−1 = k with probability at least 1/(nK). Therefore,
P(k ∈ S(i)2j∗ |k /∈ S
(i)
j ∀ k ∈ {j∗ + 1, . . . , 2j∗ − 1}) ≥ 1/(nK).
Subtracting both sides from 1 and iterating yields the desired bound on (6):
P(k /∈ S(i)j ∀ k ∈ {j∗ + 1, . . . , 2j∗}) ≤
(
1− 1
nK
)j∗
.
To bound (5), first let j ∈ {j∗ + 1, . . . , 2j∗}. Then by definition of E(i)j∗ and the union bound,
P
(
T
(i)
k (A2j∗) <
ζα logA2j∗
∆2k
, E(i)j∗ , k ∈ S
(i)
j
)
≤
Aj∑
t=1+Aj−1
P
(
T
(i)
1 (Aj∗) >
jβ∗
2
, T
(i)
k (A2j∗) <
ζα logA2j∗
∆2k
, k ∈ S(i)j , I(i)t = 1
)
. (7)
Next, for t ∈ {1 +Aj−1, . . . , Aj}, we bound the t-th summand in (7) by modifying arguments from
[4]. First note k ∈ S(i)j , I(i)t = 1 implies (by Algorithm 1)
X¯
(i)
k,T
(i)
k (t−1)
+ c
t,T
(i)
k (t−1)
≤ X¯(i)
1,T
(i)
1 (t−1)
+ c
t,T
(i)
1 (t−1)
,
where X¯(i)k,s is the average of s independent Bernoulli(µk) random variables and ct,s =
√
α log(t)/s.
This further implies (by the bounds on T (i)1 (Aj∗), T
(i)
k (A2j∗) in (7), since T
(i)
1 (·), T (i)k (·) are increas-
ing functions, and since Aj∗ < 1 +Aj−1 ≤ t ≤ Aj ≤ A2j∗ ) that
min
σk∈{1,...,bζα log(A2j∗ )/∆2kc}
X¯
(i)
k,σk
+ ct,σk ≤ max
σ1∈{djβ∗ /2e,...,t}
X¯
(i)
1,σ1
+ ct,σ1 .
Thus, with another union bound, we can bound the t-th summand in (7) by
P
(
T
(i)
1 (Aj∗) >
jβ∗
2
, T
(i)
k (A2j∗) <
ζα logA2j∗
∆2k
, k ∈ S(i)j , I(i)t = 1
)
≤
bζα log(A2j∗ )/∆2kc∑
σk=1
t∑
σ1=djβ∗ /2e
P(X¯(i)k,σk + ct,σk ≤ X¯
(i)
1,σ1
+ ct,σ1). (8)
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Fixing σk, σ1 as in the double summation, we claim X¯
(i)
k,σk
+ ct,σk ≤ X¯(i)1,σ1 + ct,σ1 implies that
X¯
(i)
k,σk
≤ µk − λct,σk or X¯(i)1,σ1 ≥ µ1 + ct,σ1 . Indeed, if both inequalities fail, then
X¯
(i)
k,σk
+ ct,σk > µk + (1− λ)ct,σk = µ1 −∆k + (1− λ)ct,σk
> X¯
(i)
1,σ1
− ct,σ1 −∆k + (1− λ)ct,σk ≥ X¯(i)1,σ1 + ct,σ1 ,
which is a contradiction; here the equality is by definition of ∆k and the final inequality holds since
(1− λ)ct,σk − 2ct,σ1 =
√
α log t
(
1− λ√
σk
− 2√
σ1
)
≥√α logAj∗
(
∆k(1− λ)√
ζα logA2j∗
− 2
√
2
j
β/2
∗
)
≥ ∆k,
where the first inequality uses t ≥ Aj∗ , σk ≤ ζα log(A2l∗)/∆2k, σ1 ≥ jβ∗ /2 and the second uses (3).
From this implication, we can write
P(X¯(i)k,σk + ct,σk ≤ X¯
(i)
1,σ1
+ ct,σ1) ≤ P(X¯(i)k,σk ≤ µk − λct,σk) + P(X¯
(i)
1,σ1
≥ µ1 + ct,σ1)
≤ e−2αλ2 log t + e−2α log t < 2e−2αλ2 log t = 2t−2αλ2 ,
where the second inequality uses a standard Chernoff bound and the third uses λ < 1. Combining
this inequality with (7) and (8), then substituting into (5), we have shown
2j∗∑
j=j∗+1
P
(
T
(i)
k (A2j∗) <
ζα logA2j∗
∆2k
, E(i)j∗ , k ∈ S
(i)
j
)
≤
2j∗∑
j=j∗+1
Aj∑
t=1+Aj−1
bζα log(A2j∗ )/∆2kc∑
σk=1
t∑
σ1=djβ∗ /2e
2t−2αλ
2
<
2ζα logA2j∗
∆2k
∞∑
t=1+Aj∗
t1−2αλ
2
.
We also observe that by assumption j∗ ≥ (2β + 1)1/β , and since j∗, β > 1,
d(2j∗)βe < (2j∗)β + 1 < (2β + 1)jβ∗ < j2β∗ ⇒ logA2j∗ = logd(2j∗)βe < 2β log j∗.
Finally, we use Aj∗ ≥ jβ∗ , λ >
√
1/α, and an integral approximation to write
∞∑
t=1+Aj∗
t1−2αλ
2 ≤
∫ ∞
t=jβ∗
t1−2αλ
2
dt =
j
2β(1−αλ2)
∗
2(αλ2 − 1) .
Combining the previous three inequalities yields the desired bound on (5).
We finish the proof of the theorem by showing P(G(i)j∗ , E
(i)
j∗ )→ 0. Note by the regret decomposition
R
(i)
A2j∗
=
∑K
k=2 ∆kT
(i)
k (A2j∗) and the union bound, it suffices to show that for any k,
lim
j∗→∞
P
(
T
(i)
k (A2j∗)
logA2j∗
<
(1− δ)α(1− 1/√α)2
∆2k
, E(i)j∗
)
= 0. (9)
We prove (9) using Lemma 1. First, we define λ = λ(j∗) by
λ(j∗) =
√
1 + 1/
√
log j∗
α
. (10)
We choose ζ = ζ(j∗) such that (3) holds with equality, i.e.,√
α logAj∗
(
∆k(1− λ(j∗))√
ζ(j∗)α logA2j∗
− 2
√
2
j
β/2
∗
)
= ∆k. (11)
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We claim (and will return to prove) ζ(j∗) → (1 − 1/
√
α)2 as j∗ → ∞. Assuming this holds, we
have ζ(j∗) > (1− δ)(1− 1/
√
α)2 > 0 for all large j∗. Also, it is clear that 1/
√
α < λ(j∗) < 1 for
large j∗. Hence, the assumptions of Lemma 1 hold for large j∗, so for such j∗,
P
(
T
(i)
k (A2j∗)
logA2j∗
<
αζ(j∗)
∆2k
, E(i)j∗
)
≤ 2αβζ(j∗) log(j∗)j
2β(1−αλ(j∗)2)∗
∆2k(αλ(j∗)2 − 1)
+
(
1− 1
nK
)j∗
. (12)
Note that by monotonicity and ζ(j∗) > (1− δ)(1− 1/
√
α)2 for large j∗, (9) will follow if we can
show the right side of (12) vanishes. Clearly (1− 1/(nK))j∗ → 0. For the first term in (12), note
log(j∗)j
2β(1−αλ(j∗)2)∗
αλ(j∗)2 − 1 = (log j∗)
3/2j
−2β/√log j∗∗ = e
3
2 log(log j∗)−2β
√
log j∗ −−−−→
j∗→∞
0,
so since α, β,∆k are constants and limj∗→∞ ζ(j∗) <∞, the first term in (12) vanishes as well.
It remains to show ζ(j∗)→ (1− 1/
√
α)2. By definition Aj∗ = djβ∗ e, one can verify
lim
j∗→∞
logAj∗
logA2j∗
= 1, lim
j∗→∞
logAj∗
jβ∗
= 0,
which, combined with (10) and (11), implies
1 = lim
j∗→∞
1− λ(j∗)√
ζ(j∗)
= lim
j∗→∞
1−
√
1+1/
√
log j∗
α√
ζ(j∗)
,
so ζ(j∗)→ (1− 1/
√
α)2 indeed holds.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Our proof will utilize a construction from [12, Appendix B.1] that we define here for completeness.
First, let S(i) = {W ⊂ {1, . . . ,K} : |W | = S + 2, Sˆ(i) ∪ {1} ⊂ W} denote the (S + 2)-sized
subsets of arms containing the sticky set Sˆ(i) and the best arm 1. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ N,
W = {w1, . . . , wS+2} ∈ S(i), and (a1, . . . , aS+2) ∈ (N ∪ {0})S+2, define
ξ
(i)
j (W,a1, . . . , aS+2) = {S(i)j = W,T (i)w1 (Aj−1) = a1, . . . , T (i)wS+2(Aj−1) = aS+2, B(i)j 6= 1}.
to be the event that honest agent i’s active set is W at phase j, arm wl ∈ W was played al times
before phase j began (for each l), and 1 is not the most played arm during phase j. Also define
Ξ
(i)
j = ∪W∈S(i) ∪(a1,...,aS+2)∈(N∪{0})S+2 ξ(i)j (W,a1, . . . , aS+2)
to be the union (over active sets and histories of plays) of all such events. Let χ(i)j = 1(Ξ
(i)
j ), where
1(·) is the indicator function. Thus, χ(i)j = 0 implies the best arm 1 is not active for i at phase j, or it
is active and it is most played (under any history of plays). Using χ(i)j , define the random variables
τ
(i)
stab = inf{j ∈ N : χ(i)j′ = 0 ∀ j′ ∈ {j, j + 1, . . .}}, τstab = max
i∈{1,...,n}
τ
(i)
stab.
Thus, at the τstab-th phase, and at all phases thereafter, the best arm 1 will be the most played for any
honest agent with this arm in its active set. Finally, let
τ (i)spr = inf{j ≥ τstab : 1 ∈ S(i)j } − τstab, τspr = max
i∈{1,...,n}
τ (i)spr, τ = τstab + τspr.
Thus, at the τ -th phase, and at all phases thereafter, the active set contains the best arm 1 and this arm
is most played, for all honest agents. Note the definition of τ implies the following property:
1 ∈ S(i)j , B(i)j = 1 ∀ j ∈ {τ, τ + 1, . . .} ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (13)
This holds inductively: for any i, 1 ∈ S(i)
τ
(i)
spr+τstab
by definition of τ (i)spr, so B
(i)
τ
(i)
spr+τstab
= 1 by
definition of τstab, so 1 ∈ S(i)
τ
(i)
spr+τstab+1
by Algorithm 1, etc. By definition of τ , (13) follows.
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Remark 8. [12, Proposition 1] establishes an even stronger property in the absence of malicious
agents: S(i)j = S
(i)
τ ∀ j ≥ τ . This follows because S(i)j+1 = S(i)j unless R(i)j /∈ S(i)j in Algorithm 1
(i.e., unless the recommendation is not currently active); by (13), R(i)j = 1 ∈ S(i)j ∀ j ≥ τ . Thus,
in words, the active sets remain fixed at and after τ when all agents are honest, which allows one
to treat regret after time Aτ as in the standard single-agent bandit setting. With the introduction of
malicious agents, no claim of fixed active sets can be made, which prohibits this approach. However,
the forthcoming analysis (in particular Appendix B.3) shows that blacklisting prevents these active
sets from changing infinitely often at late phases, and that regret analysis remains tractable.
Having defined the random variable τ , we separate regret before and after Aτ :
R
(i)
T =
Aτ∑
t=1
∆
I
(i)
t
+
T∑
t=Aτ+1
∆
I
(i)
t
≤ Aτ +
T∑
t=Aτ+1
∆
I
(i)
t
= Aτ +
K∑
k=2
∆k
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k).
(For a, b ∈ Z with a > b and {xt}t∈N ⊂ R, we use the convention
∑b
t=a xt = 0.) Next, let
S
(i)
= {2, . . . ,K} ∩ Sˆ(i) and S(i) = {2, . . . ,K} \ Sˆ(i) denote the suboptimal sticky and non-sticky
arms for agent i, respectively, and let γ ∈ (0, 1) be a constant to be chosen later. Then
K∑
k=2
∆k
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k) =
∑
k∈S(i)
∆k
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k) +
∑
k∈S(i)
∆k
AdTγ/βe∧T∑
t=Aτ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k)
+
∑
k∈S(i)
∆k
T∑
t=AdTγ/βe∨τ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k).
Combining the previous two equations and taking expectation, we obtain
ER(i)T ≤ EAτ +
∑
k∈S(i)
∆kE
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k) (14)
+
∑
k∈S(i)
∆kE
AdTγ/βe∧T∑
t=Aτ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k) +
∑
k∈S(i)
∆kE
T∑
t=AdTγ/βe∨τ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k).
In words, the first term accounts for regret incurred at early times, i.e., before all agents are aware
of the best arm and only recommend this arm moving forward. The remaining terms account for
regret incurred from sticky arms at later times, from non-sticky arms at intermediate times, and from
non-sticky arms at later times. The following four lemmas bound each of these terms.
Lemma 2 (Early regret). For any β > 1, η > 1, α > 3+(1+βη)/β2 ,
EAτ ≤ 21+βη
(
4 +
(
26α(S + 2)
(β − 1)∆22
)2/(β−1))βη
+
10β
β − 1 max{6(m+ n) max{log n, 2(β − 1)}, 3(6
η + 2)}β
+
2β(2α−3)+1n
(
K
2
)
(S + 1)
(2α− 3)(β(2α− 3)− 1)((β(2α− 3)− 1)/η − β) .
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Lemma 3 (Late regret from sticky arms).∑
k∈S(i)
∆kE
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k) ≤
∑
k∈S(i)
4α log T
∆k
+ 2|S(i)|
∞∑
t=1
t2(1−α).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
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Lemma 4 (Intermediate regret from non-sticky arms). For any γ ∈ (0, 1),
∑
k∈S(i)
∆kE
AdTγ/βe∧T∑
t=Aτ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k) ≤
∑
k∈S(i)
4α log(AdTγ/βe ∧ T )
∆k
+ 2|S(i)|
AdTγ/βe∑
t=1
t2(1−α)
≤ 4αγK log T
∆2
+
8αβK
∆2
+ 2|S(i)|
AdTγ/βe∑
t=1
t2(1−α).
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Lemma 5 (Late regret from non-sticky arms). For any γ ∈ (0, 1),
∑
k∈S(i)
∆kE
T∑
t=AdTγ/βe∨τ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k) ≤
2η − 1
η − 1 maxS˜⊂S(i):|S˜|≤m+2
∑
k∈S˜
4α log T
∆k
+
8αβ logη(1/γ)(m+ 2)
∆2
+ 2|S(i)|
∞∑
t=1+AdTγ/βe
t2(1−α).
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
We now show that these four lemmas imply the theorem. We begin by bounding ER(i)T − EAτ in
each of two different cases. For the first case, we assume
2η − 1
η − 1
m+3∑
k=2
1
∆k
+
S+m+4∑
k=m+4
1
∆k
≤
K∑
k=2
1
∆k
. (15)
Set γ = ∆2/(K∆S+m+4) ∈ (0, 1). By Lemmas 3 and 5, and the second bound from Lemma 4,
ER(i)T − EAτ ≤ 4α
2η − 1
η − 1 maxS˜⊂S(i):|S˜|≤m+2
∑
k∈S˜
1
∆k
+
∑
k∈S(i)
1
∆k
+
1
∆S+m+4
 log T (16)
+
8αβ(K + logη(K/∆2)(m+ 2))
∆2
+ 2(|S(i)|+ |S(i)|)
∞∑
t=1
t2(1−α), (17)
where we also used 1/γ ≤ K/∆2 in (17). Note |S(i)|+ |S(i)| = K − 1 by definition, and
∞∑
t=1
t2(1−α) = 1 +
∞∑
t=2
t2(1−α) < 1 +
∫ ∞
t=1
t2(1−α)dt =
2(α− 1)
2α− 3 . (18)
Also, since ∆k ≤ ∆k+1 and η > 1, the term in parentheses in (16) is maximized if {2, . . . ,m+3} ⊂
S(i) and S
(i)
= {m+ 4, . . . , S +m+ 3} (note (15) ensures S +m+ 3 ≤ K). Therefore,
2η − 1
η − 1 maxS˜⊂S(i):|S˜|≤m+2
∑
k∈S˜
1
∆k
+
∑
k∈S(i)
1
∆k
+
1
∆S+m+4
≤ 2η − 1
η − 1
m+3∑
k=2
1
∆k
+
S+m+4∑
k=m+4
1
∆k
.
Combining the previous three inequalities, we have shown that if (15) holds,
ER(i)T − EAτ ≤ 4α
(
2η − 1
η − 1
m+3∑
k=2
1
∆k
+
S+m+4∑
k=m+4
1
∆k
)
log T (19)
+
8αβ(K + logη(K/∆2)(m+ 2))
∆2
+
4K(α− 1)
2α− 3 .
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If (15) fails, choose any γ ∈ (log(T − 1)/ log(T ), 1). Then AdTγ/βe = ddT γ/βeβe ≥ T γ > T − 1,
so AdTγ/βe ≥ T , and the final term in (14) is zero. Moreover, AdTγ/βe ∧ T = T by choice of γ.
Then by Lemma 3 and the first bound in Lemma 4, and an integral approximation like (18),
ER(i)T − EAτ ≤ 4α log(T )
K∑
k=2
1
∆k
+
4K(α− 1)
2α− 3
≤ 4α log(T )
K∑
k=2
1
∆k
+
4K(α− 1)
2α− 3 +
8αβ(K + logη(K/∆2)(m+ 2))
∆2
, (20)
where for the second inequality we added a nonnegative term. To summarize, we showed (19) holds
if (15) holds and (20) holds if (15) fails. Combined with Lemma 2,
ER(i)T ≤ 4αmin
{
2η − 1
η − 1
m+3∑
k=2
1
∆k
+
S+m+4∑
k=m+4
1
∆k
,
K∑
k=2
1
∆k
}
log(T ) + CK,∆2,n,m,S,α,β,η,
where
CK,∆2,n,m,S,α,β,η = 2
1+βη
(
4 +
(
26α(S + 2)
(β − 1)∆22
)2/(β−1))βη
(21)
+
2β(2α−3)+1n
(
K
2
)
(S + 1)
(2α− 3)(β(2α− 3)− 1)((β(2α− 3)− 1)/η − β)
+
10β
β − 1 max{6(m+ n) max{log n, 2(β − 1)}, 3(6
η + 2)}β
+
4K(α− 1)
2α− 3 +
8αβ(K + logη(K/∆2)(m+ 2))
∆2
= O((S/∆22)
2βη/(β−1) + SnK2 + ((m+ n) log n)β
+ (K/∆2) +m log(K/∆2)/∆2).
We now return to prove the lemmas. We begin with Lemmas 3 and 4 in Appendices B.1 and B.2,
respectively, which require only small modifications of standard arguments from [4]. We then prove
Lemma 5 in Appendix B.3, which uses similar arguments but requires significantly more alterations.
Lastly, we prove Lemma 2 in Appendix B.4, which leverages a result from [12] but requires nontrivial
modification. To avoid cluttering these proofs, we defer some proofs that require elementary (but
tedious) calculations to Appendix B.5. Moving forward, we define A−1(t) = inf{j ∈ N : t ≤ Aj}.
Note I(i)t ∈ S(i)A−1(t), i.e., at time t, agent i chooses an arm from S
(i)
A−1(t) ⊂ {1, . . . ,K}.
B.1 Late regret from sticky arms (proof of Lemma 3)
We bound the number of pulls of k ∈ S(i) using ideas from [4]. First, we write
E
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k) = E
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1
(
I
(i)
t = k, T
(i)
k (t− 1) <
4α log T
∆2k
)
(22)
+ E
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1
(
I
(i)
t = k, T
(i)
k (t− 1) ≥
4α log T
∆2k
)
. (23)
By definition T (i)k (t− 1) =
∑t−1
s=1 1(I
(i)
s = k), we can bound (22) by observing that, almost surely,
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1
(
I
(i)
t = k, T
(i)
k (t− 1) <
4α log T
∆2k
)
≤ 4α log T
∆2k
. (24)
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To bound (23), we first note
E
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1
(
I
(i)
t = k, T
(i)
k (t− 1) ≥
4α log T
∆2k
)
=
T∑
t=1
P
(
t > Aτ , I
(i)
t = k, T
(i)
k (t− 1) ≥
4α log T
∆2k
)
.
Now let t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Note t > Aτ implies A−1(t) > τ by definition of A−1, which by (13)
implies 1 ∈ S(i)A−1(t) (i.e., i is aware of arm 1 at t). Thus, t > Aτ and I
(i)
t = k imply agent i chose
arm k over arm 1 at time t, which implies
X¯
(i)
1,T
(i)
1 (t−1)
+ c
t,T
(i)
1 (t−1)
≤ X¯(i)
k,T
(i)
k (t−1)
+ c
t,T
(i)
k (t−1)
,
where X¯(i)k,s is the average of s independent Bernoulli(µk) and ct,s =
√
α log(t)/s. Thus,
P
(
t > Aτ , I
(i)
t = k, T
(i)
k (t− 1) ≥
4α log T
∆2k
)
≤ P
(
X¯
(i)
1,T
(i)
1 (t−1)
+ c
t,T
(i)
1 (t−1)
≤ X¯(i)
k,T
(i)
k (t−1)
+ c
t,T
(i)
k (t−1)
, T
(i)
k (t− 1) ≥
4α log T
∆2k
)
≤ 2t2(1−α), (25)
where the second inequality is the classical bound from [4]. Substituting into (23),
E
T∑
t=Aτ+1
1
(
I
(i)
t = k, T
(i)
k (t− 1) ≥
4α log T
∆2k
)
≤ 2
∞∑
t=1
t2(1−α). (26)
Finally, plugging (26) into (23) and (24) into (22) and summing over k completes the proof.
B.2 Intermediate regret from non-sticky arms (proof of Lemma 4)
The first bound follows by replacing T with AdTγ/βe ∧ T and S(i) with S(i) in the proof of Lemma
3, but otherwise repeating the same arguments. For the second bound, first note
AdTγ/βe = ddT γ/βeβe ≤ (T γ/β + 1)β + 1 ≤ 2β+1T γ < e2βT γ , (27)
where the first inequality is dxe ≤ x+ 1, the second uses T ≥ 1, and the third uses β > 1. Therefore,
log(AdTγ/βe ∧ T ) ≤ log(AdTγ/βe) < γ log(T ) + 2β.
Combined with the inequalities ∆2 ≤ ∆k and |S(i)| < K, we thus obtain∑
k∈S(i)
4α log(AdTγ/βe ∧ T )
∆k
<
4αK(γ log(T ) + 2β)
∆2
=
4αγK log T
∆2
+
8αβK
∆2
.
B.3 Late regret from non-sticky arms (proof of Lemma 5)
For each k ∈ S(i) and each l, t ∈ N, define the random variables
Xk,l,t = 1
(
t > Aτ , I
(i)
t = k, T
(i)
k (t− 1) ≥
4α log(AdTγηl/βe ∧ T )
∆2k
)
Yk,l,t = 1
(
t > Aτ , I
(i)
t = k, T
(i)
k (t− 1) <
4α log(AdTγηl/βe ∧ T )
∆2k
)
.
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We can then rewrite the number of pulls of arm k ∈ S(i) after time AdTγ/βe∨τ as
T∑
t=AdTγ/βe∨τ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k) =
T∑
t=AdTγ/βe+1
1(t > Aτ , I
(i)
t = k) (28)
=
dlogη(1/γ)e∑
l=1
AdTγηl/βe∧T∑
t=1+AdTγηl−1/βe
(Xk,l,t + Yk,l,t). (29)
(Note the first term of the double summation in (29) corresponds to time 1 + AdTγη1−1/βe =
1 +AdTγ/βe, and the final term corresponds to time
AdTγηdlogη(1/γ)e/βe ∧ T = ddT
γηdlogη(1/γ)e/βeβe ∧ T = T, (30)
so all summands in (28) are accounted for in (29).) Therefore,
∑
k∈S(i)
∆kE
T∑
t=AdTγ/βe∨τ+1
1(I
(i)
t = k) ≤
∑
k∈S(i)
∆k
dlogη(1/γ)e∑
l=1
AdTγηl/βe∧T∑
t=1+AdTγηl−1/βe
P(Xk,l,t = 1)(31)
+ E
dlogη(1/γ)e∑
l=1
∑
k∈S(i)
∆k
AdTγηl/βe∑
t=1+AdTγηl−1/βe
Yk,l,t. (32)
(Note we also used AdTγηl/βe ∧ T ≤ AdTγηl/βe in (32).) We next bound (31). Choose any k ∈ S(i),
l ∈ {1, . . . , dlogη(1/γ)e}, and t ∈ {1 + AdTγηl−1/βe, . . . , AdTγηl/βe ∧ T}. Then following the
argument leading to (25) in the proof of Lemma 3,
P(Xk,l,t = 1) = P
(
t > Aτ , I
(i)
t = k, T
(i)
k (t− 1) ≥
4α log(AdTγηl/βe ∧ T )
∆2k
)
≤ 2t2(1−α).
(To be precise, T should be replaced by AdTγηl/βe ∧ T in this argument; the same argument then
applies since we are considering t ≤ AdTγηl/βe ∧ T .) We thus obtain the following for (31):
∑
k∈S(i)
∆k
dlogη(1/γ)e∑
l=1
AdTγηl/βe∧T∑
t=1+AdTγηl−1/βe
P(Xk,l,t = 1) ≤ 2|S(i)|
∞∑
t=1+AdTγ/βe
t2(1−α). (33)
To bound (32), we begin with two key claims. The first claim roughly says that if arm k is pulled at
time A
Tγηl−1/β < t ≤ ATγηl/β (which occurs if Yk,l,t = 1), then k must have been active at some
phase between T γη
l−1/β and T γη
l/β . Thus, this claim is rather obvious; the only subtlety is that the
indicator function in (34) does not depend on t, which will be crucial later (see (41) below).
Claim 1. For any l ∈ {1, . . . , dlogη(1/γ)e, k ∈ S(i), and t ∈ {1 +AdTγηl−1/βe, . . . , AdTγηl/βe},
Yk,l,t = 1
(
k ∈ ∪dTγη
l/βe
j=dTγηl−1/βe∨τS
(i)
j
)
Yk,l,t a.s. (34)
Proof. Fix l, k, t. Recall Yk,l,t is binary-valued, so it suffices to show
Yk,l,t = 1 ⇒ k ∈ ∪dT
γηl/βe
j=dTγηl−1/βe∨τS
(i)
j . (35)
We prove (35) by contradiction: assume instead that Yk,l,t = 1 and
k /∈ ∪dTγη
l/βe
j=dTγηl−1/βe∨τS
(i)
j . (36)
19
Recall Yk,l,t = 1 implies t > Aτ by definition of Yk,l,t; since t ∈ {1 +AdTγηl−1/βe, . . . , AdTγηl/βe}
in the statement of the claim, we conclude
t ∈ {1 +AdTγηl−1/βe∨τ , . . . , AdTγηl/βe}.
It follows by definition of A−1 that A−1(t) ∈ {dT γηl−1/βe ∨ τ, . . . , dT γηl/βe}, so
S
(i)
A−1(t) ⊂ ∪
dTγηl/βe
j=dTγηl−1/βe∨τS
(i)
j . (37)
Comparing (36) and (37) shows k /∈ SA−1(t) (i.e., k is not an active arm at time t); this implies
I
(i)
t 6= k (i.e., k is not pulled at time t), contradicting Yk,l,t = 1 by definition.
The second claim bounds the sum of inverse arm gaps for suboptimal non-sticky arms pulled between
phases T γη
l−1/β and T γη
l/β . The idea is that each of m malicious agents can only recommend one
such arm between these phases (since if this recommendation occurs at phase j ≥ T γηl−1/β , the
agent is blacklisted until jη ≥ T γηl/β). Similar to the previous claim, the upper bound is uniform
across l, which is crucial in its application (42).
Claim 2. For any l ∈ {1, . . . , dlogη(1/γ)e},∑
k∈S(i)
1
∆k
1
(
k ∈ ∪dTγη
l/βe
j=dTγηl−1/βe∨τS
(i)
j
)
≤ max
S˜⊂S(i):|S˜|≤m+2
∑
k∈S˜
1
∆k
a.s.
Proof. Fix l ∈ {1, . . . , dlogη(1/γ)e} and define the set
S(i)(l) = S(i) ∩
(
∪dTγη
l/βe
j=dTγηl−1/βe∨τS
(i)
j
)
.
Note it suffices to show |S(i)(l)| ≤ m+ 2 a.s.; indeed, if this inequality holds, we obtain∑
k∈S(i)
1
∆k
1
(
k ∈ ∪dTγη
l/βe
j=dTγηl−1/βe∨τS
(i)
j
)
=
∑
k∈S(i)(l)
1
∆k
≤ max
S˜⊂S(i):|S˜|≤m+2
∑
k∈S˜
1
∆k
a.s.
To prove |S(i)(l)| ≤ m + 2, we show |S(i)(l)| > m + 2 yields a contradiction. If |S(i)| ≤ m + 2,
we are done, so we assume S(i) ≥ m+ 3. For this nontrivial case, we begin with some definitions.
First, let k1, . . . , km+3 be distinct elements of S(i)(l). For b ∈ {1, . . . ,m+ 3}, set
jb = min
{
j ∈ {dT γηl−1/βe ∨ τ, . . . , dT γηl/βe} : kb ∈ S(i)j
}
. (38)
Note jb is well-defined since kb ∈ S(i)(l). Also note we can assume (without loss of generality, after
possibly relabeling {kb}m+3b=1 ) that j1 ≤ · · · ≤ jm+3. We claim
jb > dT γηl−1/βe ∨ τ ∀ b ∈ {3, . . . ,m+ 3}. (39)
This is easily proven by contradiction. Suppose jb = dT γηl−1/βe ∨ τ for some b ≥ 3. Then
since j1 ≤ · · · ≤ jb by assumption and jb′ ≥ dT γηl−1/βe ∨ τ ∀ b′ by definition, we must have
j1 = · · · = jb. Consequently, k1, . . . , kb ∈ S(i)j1 , which implies |S
(i)
j1
∩ S(i)| ≥ |{k1, . . . , kb}| ≥ 3;
in words, S(i)j1 contains three non-sticky arms. But S
(i)
j1
contains exactly two non-sticky arms in
Algorithm 1, so we have a contradiction.
Having established (39), and using the definition (38), we conclude kb ∈ S(i)jb \ S
(i)
jb−1 ∀ b ∈
{3, . . . ,m + 3}, i.e., kb was not active at phase jb − 1 but became active at phase jb. Also note
|S(i)jb \ S
(i)
jb−1| ≤ 1 in Algorithm 1, i.e., at most one arm is newly-active at each phase. Combined
with the fact that {kb}m+3b=3 are distinct arms, {jb}m+3b=3 must be distinct phases. Therefore,
dT γηl−1/βe ∨ τ < j3 < j4 < · · · < jm+3 ≤ dT γηl/βe. (40)
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Next, note kb ∈ S(i)jb \ S
(i)
jb−1 implies kb = R
(i)
jb−1 (i.e., kb was recommended at phase jb − 1).
Further, kb ∈ S(i) implies kb 6= 1 (since S(i) is a subset of suboptimal arms) and jb > τ implies
jb − 1 ≥ τ (since jb ∈ N); taken together, we must have H(i)jb−1 ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n + m} (i.e., the
arm kb was recommended by a malicious agent, which follows from (13)). Since {jb}m+3b=3 and{n+ 1, . . . , n+m} contain m+ 1 and m elements, respectively, the pigeonhole principle says that
for some i∗ ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , n+m}, b, b′ ∈ {3, . . . ,m+ 3} such that b 6= b′, H(i)jb−1 = H
(i)
jb′−1 = i
∗.
Assume (without loss of generality) that b < b′. Recall R(i)jb−1 6= 1; also, since jb > τ , (13) implies
B
(i)
jb
= 1; thus, B(i)jb 6= R
(i)
jb−1. It follows from Algorithm 3 that i
∗ ∈ P (i)j ∀ j ∈ {jb, . . . djηb e}, i.e.,
malicious agent i∗ was blacklisted until phase djηb e. But by (40) and the fact that η > 1,
djηb e ≥ jηb ≥ (T γη
l−1/β + 1)η ≥ T γηl/β + 1 ≥ dT γηl/βe ≥ jb′ > jb′ − 1,
so that i∗ ∈ P (i)jb′−1, contradicting H
(i)
jb′−1 = i
∗.
Using these claims, we derive an almost-sure bound for the sum of random variables in (32):
dlogη(1/γ)e∑
l=1
∑
k∈S(i)
∆k
AdTγηl/βe∑
t=1+AdTγηl−1/βe
Yk,l,t
=
dlogη(1/γ)e∑
l=1
∑
k∈S(i)
1
(
k ∈ ∪dTγη
l/βe
j=dTγηl−1/βe∨τS
(i)
j
)∆k
AdTγηl/βe∑
t=1+AdTγηl−1/βe
Yk,l,t
 (41)
≤
dlogη(1/γ)e∑
l=1
∑
k∈S(i)
1
(
k ∈ ∪dTγη
l/βe
j=dTγηl−1/βe∨τS
(i)
j
) 4α log(AdTγηl/βe ∧ T )
∆k
≤ 4α
 max
S˜⊂S(i):|S˜|≤m+2
∑
k∈S˜
1
∆k
 dlogη(1/γ)e∑
l=1
log(AdTγηl/βe ∧ T ) (42)
≤ 2η − 1
η − 1 maxS˜⊂S(i):|S˜|≤m+2
∑
k∈S˜
4α log T
∆k
+
8αβ logη(1/γ)(m+ 2)
∆2
. (43)
Here the first equality uses Claim 1, the first inequality holds by the argument of (24) in the proof of
Lemma 3, the second uses Claim 2, and the third uses Claim 5 from Appendix B.5 and ∆2 ≤ ∆k.
The proof of the lemma is completed by substituting (33) into (31) and (43) into (32).
B.4 Early regret (proof of Lemma 2)
We begin with a simple identity: for any j′ ∈ N,
Aj′ =
j′∑
j=1
(Aj −Aj−1) =
∞∑
j=1
(Aj −Aj−1)1(j ≤ j′).
Using this identity and rearranging summations yields
EAτ =
∞∑
j′=1
Aj′P(τ = j′) =
∞∑
j=1
(Aj −Aj−1)P(τ ≥ j).
Now define f : N→ N by f(j) = d2 + j1/η/2e ∀ j ∈ N. Then clearly
P(τ ≥ j) ≤ P(τstab ≥ f(j)) + P(τstab < f(j), τ ≥ j).
Combining the above, we obtain
EAτ ≤
∞∑
j=1
(Aj −Aj−1)P(τstab ≥ f(j)) +
∞∑
j=1
(Aj −Aj−1)P(τstab < f(j), τ ≥ j). (44)
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While the definition of f is somewhat opaque, the key property is that f(j) = Θ(j1/η) (the constants
are chosen for analytical convenience). This property ensures that if τstab < f(j), any blacklisting
that occurred before phase τstab ends by τ
η
stab < f(j)
η = Θ(j). In particular, any honest i∗ with
1 ∈ Sˆ(i∗) will not be blacklisted at phase Θ(j) (since i∗ only recommends arm 1, and i subsequently
pulls this arm most frequently, after τstab). This idea allows us to bound the second term in (44). The
first term in (44) can be bounded using tail bounds for τstab from [12].
Claim 3. Under the assumptions of Lemma 2,
∞∑
j=1
(Aj −Aj−1)P(τstab ≥ f(j)) ≤ 21+βη
(
4 +
(
26α(S + 2)
(β − 1)∆22
)2/(β−1))βη
+
2β(2α−3)+1n
(
K
2
)
(S + 1)
(2α− 3)(β(2α− 3)− 1)((β(2α− 3)− 1)/η − β) .
Proof. We first use ideas from [12] to derive a tail bound for τstab. To begin, let
j∗1 = min
{
j ∈ N : Aj′ −Aj′−1
S + 2
≥ 1 + 4α logAj′
∆22
∀ j′ ∈ {f(j), f(j) + 1, . . .}
}
, (45)
and fix j ≥ j∗1 . Note that by definition of τstab and the union bound,
P(τstab ≥ f(j)) ≤
n∑
i=1
∞∑
j′=f(j)
P(χ(i)j′ = 1). (46)
Now since j ≥ j∗1 and f is increasing, f(j) ≥ f(j∗1 ), so by definition, any j′ ≥ f(j) satisfies
Aj′ −Aj′−1
S + 2
≥ 1 + 4α logAj′
∆22
.
This is the assumption of [12, Lemma 8], so we can apply this lemma to obtain
P(χ(i)j′ = 1) ≤
2
(
K
2
)
(S + 1)
2α− 3 A
−(2α−3)
j′−1 .
(Note β, η > 1, 1 + βη < β(2α− 3) ensures 2α− 3 > 0. Also, dK/ne appears in [12, Lemma 8]
instead of S, because [12] assumes S = dK/ne; however, the proof follows for general S.) Thus,
∞∑
j′=f(j)
P(χ(i)j′ = 1) ≤
2
(
K
2
)
(S + 1)
2α− 3
∞∑
j′=f(j)
A
−(2α−3)
j′−1 (47)
We estimate the summation on the right side with an integral as follows:
∞∑
j′=f(j)
A
−(2α−3)
j′−1 =
∞∑
j′=f(j)
d(j′ − 1)βe−(2α−3) ≤
∞∑
j′=f(j)
(j′ − 1)−β(2α−3)
≤
∫ ∞
j′=f(j)
(j′ − 2)−β(2α−3)dj′ = (f(j)− 2)
1−β(2α−3)
β(2α− 3)− 1 (48)
≤ 2
β(2α−3)−1j(1−β(2α−3))/η
β(2α− 3)− 1 ,
where the final inequality is by definition of f(j) (note 1+βη < β(2α−3) guarantees β(2α−3)−1 >
0.) Together with (46) and (47), we have shown
P(τstab ≥ f(j)) ≤
2β(2α−3)n
(
K
2
)
(S + 1)j(1−β(2α−3))/η
(2α− 3)(β(2α− 3)− 1) ∀ j ≥ j
∗
1 .
Using this tail bound, we bound the quantity of interest. First, we note that since Aj = djβe, the
mean value theorem guarantees that for any j ∈ N and some j˜ ∈ (j − 1, j),
Aj −Aj−1 ≤ jβ − (j − 1)β + 1 = βj˜β−1 + 1 ≤ βjβ−1 + 1 ≤ 2βjβ−1. (49)
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Combining the previous two inequalities, we thus obtain
∞∑
j=1
(Aj −Aj−1)P(τstab ≥ f(j)) (50)
≤ Aj∗1 +
2β(2α−3)+1βn
(
K
2
)
(S + 1)
(2α− 3)(β(2α− 3)− 1)
∞∑
j=j∗1+1
j−1+β+(1−β(2α−3))/η
≤ Aj∗1 +
2β(2α−3)+1n
(
K
2
)
(S + 1)
(2α− 3)(β(2α− 3)− 1)((β(2α− 3)− 1)/η − β) ,
where the second inequality holds by an integral approximation like (48) and uses 1+βη < β(2α−3).
Now by definition of Aj and Claim 6 from Appendix B.5, we have
Aj∗1 ≤ (j∗1 )β + 1 ≤ 2(j∗1 )β ≤ 21+βη
(
4 +
(
26α(S + 2)
(β − 1)∆22
)2/(β−1))βη
.
Combining the prevoius two inequalities completes the proof.
Claim 4. Under the assumptions of Lemma 2,
∞∑
j=1
(Aj −Aj−1)P(τstab < f(j), τ ≥ j)
≤ 10β
β − 1 max{6(m+ n) max{log n, 2(β − 1)}, 3(6
η + 2)}β .
Proof. We begin by bounding the probability terms for large j. In particular, we define
j∗2 = min{j ∈ N ∩ [max{8, 6(m+ n) max{log n, 2(β − 1)}},∞) : (51)
j′ ≥ 3df(j′)ηe/2 ∀ j′ ∈ {j, j + 1, . . .}},
and we derive a bound j ∈ {j∗2 + 1, j∗2 + 2, . . .}. We first note that by definition of f and since η > 1,
j ≥ 3df(j)
ηe
2
≥ 3f(j)
2
= f(j) +
f(j)
2
≥ f(j) + d5/2e
2
= f(j) +
3
2
. (52)
Now to bound the probability terms, we first use the definition of τ and the union bound to write
P(τstab < f(j), τ ≥ j) ≤
n∑
i=1
P(τstab < f(j), inf{j′ ≥ τstab : 1 ∈ S(i)j′ } > j − 1). (53)
We fix i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and bound the i-th summand in (53). We first observe
τstab < f(j), inf{j′ ≥ τstab : 1 ∈ S(i)j′ } > j − 1 ⇒ τstab < f(j), 1 /∈ S(i)j−1, (54)
which is easily proven by contradiction: if the left side of (54) holds but 1 ∈ S(i)j−1, (52) ensures
j − 1 > f(j) > τstab, so j − 1 ∈ {j′ ≥ τstab : 1 ∈ S(i)j′ }, contradicting the left side of (54). From
(54), we immediately see the i-th summand in (53) is zero if 1 ∈ Sˆ(i). In the nontrivial case 1 /∈ Sˆ(i),
we let i∗ be any agent with 1 ∈ Sˆ(i∗) (such an agent exists by assumption) and claim
τstab < f(j), 1 /∈ S(i)j−1 ⇒ τstab < f(j), H(i)j′ 6= i∗ ∀ j′ ∈ {f(j)− 1, . . . , j − 2}. (55)
Suppose instead thatH(i)j′ = i
∗ for some j′ ∈ {f(j)−1, . . . , j−2} (note the set is nonempty by (52)).
Then since j′ ≥ f(j)− 1 ≥ τstab, the definition of τstab ensures R(i)j′ = 1 (i∗ only recommends 1 at
and after τstab), so 1 ∈ S(i)j′+1 by Algorithm 1. If j′ = j − 2, this contradicts 1 /∈ S(i)j−1 = S(i)j′+1. If
j′ < j − 2, the definition of τstab yields the same contradiction (since i never discards the best arm
after τstab). This completes the proof of (55). However, it will be more convenient to use a weaker
version (which follows from (55) since df(j)ηe ≥ f(j)):
τstab < f(j), 1 /∈ S(i)j−1 ⇒ τstab < f(j), H(i)j′ 6= i∗ ∀ j′ ∈ {df(j)ηe+ 1, . . . , j − 2}, (56)
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(Note (j − 2)− (df(j)ηe+ 1) ≥ j/3− 3 ≥ 0 since j ≥ j∗2 + 1 ≥ 9, so the set in (56) is nonempty.)
Finally, we derive one further implication:
τstab < f(j) ⇒ i∗ /∈ P (i)j′ ∀ j′ ∈ {df(j)ηe+ 1, df(j)ηe+ 2, . . .}. (57)
To prove (57), we define j∗ = sup{j′ ∈ {2, 3, . . .} : i∗ ∈ P (i)j′ \ P (i)j′−1} to be the latest phase at
which i∗ entered the blacklist. We consider two cases:
• j∗ > f(j): First note i∗ ∈ P (i)j∗ \ P (i)j∗−1 implies H(i)j∗−1 = i∗ and B(i)j∗ 6= R(i)j∗−1 (i.e., to
enter the blacklist at j∗, i∗ must recommend an arm to i at j∗−1 that was not i’s most played
in phase j∗.) Since f(j) > τstab and j∗, f(j), τstab ∈ N, we must have j∗ ≥ τstab + 2, so
j∗ − 1 > τstab, and B(i)j∗ = R(i)j∗−1 = 1 by definition of τstab. Thus, this case cannot occur.
• j∗ ≤ f(j): Suppose the right side of (57) fails, i.e., i∗ ∈ P (i)j′ for some j′ ≥ df(j)ηe+ 1.
Then by Algorithm 3, there must be some phase j? such that i∗ ∈ P (i)j? \ P
(i)
j?−1 and
j′ ∈ {j?, . . . , djη? e} (i.e., i∗ entered the blacklist at j? and j′ lies within the blacklisting
period); in particular, j′ ≤ djη? e But djη? e ≤ d(j∗)ηe ≤ df(j)ηe < j′ (by definition of j∗
and assumption on f(j), j′), a contradiction.
Stringing together the implications (54), (56), and (57), we have shown
τstab < f(j), inf{j′ ≥ τstab : 1 ∈ S(i)j′ } > j − 1⇒ ∩j−2j′=df(j)ηe+1{i∗ /∈ P (i)j′ , H(i)j′ 6= i∗}. (58)
We bound the probability of the event at right by writing
P(∩j−2j′=df(j)ηe+1{i∗ /∈ P (i)j′ , H(i)j′ 6= i∗})
≤ P(H(i)j−2 6= i∗|{i∗ /∈ P (i)j−2} ∩ ∩j−3j′=df(j)ηe+1{i∗ /∈ P (i)j′ , H(i)j′ 6= i∗})
× P(∩j−3j′=df(j)ηe+1{i∗ /∈ P (i)j′ , H(i)j′ 6= i∗})
<
(
1− 1
m+ n
)
P(∩j−3j′=df(j)ηe+1{i∗ /∈ P (i)j′ , H(i)j′ 6= i∗})
< · · · <
(
1− 1
m+ n
)j−df(j)ηe−2
≤ 4
(
1− 1
m+ n
)j/3
, (59)
where the second inequality holds since H(i)j−2 is chosen uniformly from [m + n] \ ({i} ∩ P (i)j−2),
which (conditioned on i∗ /∈ P (i)j−2) contains at most m+ n− 1 agents, including i∗, and the fourth
uses m,n ∈ N and j ≥ 3df(j)ηe/2 by definition of j∗2 . Combining (53), (58), and (59),
P(τstab < f(j), τ ≥ j) ≤ 4n
(
1− 1
m+ n
)j/3
.
Finally, we write
∞∑
j=1
(Aj −Aj−1)P(τstab < f(j), τ ≥ j)
≤ Aj∗2 + 8β
∞∑
j=j∗2+1
jβ−1n
(
1− 1
m+ n
)j/3
≤ 2(j∗2 )β +
8β(j∗2 )
β
(β − 1)n ≤
10β
β − 1(j
∗
2 )
β
≤ 10β
β − 1 max{6(m+ n) max{log n, 2(β − 1)}, 3(6
η + 2)}β ,
where the first inequality follows the argument of (49)-(50) from the proof of Claim 3, the second
uses Claim 7 from Appendix B.5 and Aj = djβe ≤ jβ + 1 ≤ 2jβ , the third uses β > 1 and n ∈ N,
and the fourth uses Claim 8 from Appendix B.5.
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B.5 Auxiliary inequalities
Claim 5. For any γ ∈ (0, 1),
dlogη(1/γ)e∑
l=1
log(AdTγηl/βe ∧ T ) ≤
2η − 1
η − 1 log(T ) + 2β logη(1/γ).
Proof. We first recall T ∧AdTγηdlogη(1/γ)e/βe = T (see (30)), so
dlogη(1/γ)e∑
l=1
log(AdTγηl/βe ∧ T ) ≤
dlogη(1/γ)e−1∑
l=1
log(AdTγηl/βe) + log(T ). (60)
For the remaining sum, first note AdTγηl/βe ≤ e2βT γη
l
by an argument similar to (27). Therefore,
dlogη(1/γ)e−1∑
l=1
log(AdTγηl/βe) ≤ γ log(T )
dlogη(1/γ)e−1∑
l=1
ηl + 2β logη(1/γ), (61)
where we also used dxe ≤ x+ 1. On the other hand, we observe
γ log(T )
dlogη(1/γ)e−1∑
l=1
ηl = γ log(T )
ηdlogη(1/γ)e − η
η − 1 ≤ γ log(T )
η
γ − η
η − 1 ≤
η log T
η − 1 , (62)
where the equality computes a geometric series, the first inequality uses dxe ≤ x+ 1, and the second
inequality discards a negative term. Combining (60), (61) and (62) completes the proof.
Claim 6. Assume α ≥ 3/2. Then j∗1 ≤ j1, where j∗1 is defined in (45) and
j1 = 2
η
(
4 +
(
26α(S + 2)
(β − 1)∆22
)2/(β−1))η
.
Proof. Let j ∈ {f(j1), f(j1) + 1, . . .}; by definition of j∗1 , we aim show
Aj −Aj−1
S + 2
≥ 1 + 4α logAj
∆22
.
First recall f(j1) ≥ j1/η1 /2 by definition, so
j ≥ f(j1) ≥ j
1/η
1
2
= 4 +
(
26α(S + 2)
(β − 1)∆22
)2/(β−1)
≥ max
{
4, 1 +
(
26α(S + 2)
(β − 1)∆22
)2/(β−1)}
.
(63)
Next, observe that by definition Aj = djβe, and since β > 1 by assumption and j ≥ 2 by (63),
Aj ≤ jβ + 1 ≤ 2jβ ≤ 2(2(j − 1))β = 2β+1(j − 1)β < e2β(j − 1)β .
Using this inequality, we can write
1 + (S + 2)
1 + 4α logAj
∆22
≤ 1 + (S + 2)1 + 8αβ + 4αβ log(j − 1)
∆22
.
Now since j ≥ 4 by (63), log(j − 1) > 1, so
1 + (S + 2)
1 + 8αβ + 4αβ log(j − 1)
∆22
<
(
1 + (S + 2)
1 + 12αβ
∆22
)
log(j − 1).
For the term in parentheses, we write
1 + (S + 2)
1 + 12αβ
∆22
≤ S + 3 + 12αβ(S + 2)
∆22
<
13αβ(S + 2)
∆22
,
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where the first inequality is ∆2 ≤ 1 and the second is S + 3 ≤ αβ(S + 2) (which holds since
α ≥ 3/2, β > 1). Combining the previous three inequalities, we have shown
1 + (S + 2)
1 + 4α logAj
∆22
≤ 13αβ(S + 2) log(j − 1)
∆22
= β
26α(S + 2)
(β − 1)∆22
log((j − 1)(β−1)/2)
≤ β(j − 1)(β−1)/2 log((j − 1)(β−1)/2) ≤ β(j − 1)β−1,
where the equality rearranges the expression, the second inequality is (63), and the third inequality is
log x ≤ x. Rearranging, we have shown
1 + 4α logAj
∆22
≤ β(j − 1)
β−1 − 1
S + 2
≤ Aj −Aj−1
S + 2
,
where the second inequality holds similar to (2) in Appendix A.
Claim 7. Defining j∗2 as in (51),
∞∑
j=j∗2+1
jβ−1n
(
1− 1
m+ n
)j/3
≤ (j
∗
2 )
β
(β − 1)n.
Proof. We begin by observing that for any j ≥ j∗2 ≥ 6(m+ n) log n,(
1− 1
m+ n
)j/6
≤ exp
(
− j
6(m+ n)
)
≤ 1
n
,
where we also used 1− x ≤ e−x. Consequently,
n
(
1− 1
m+ n
)j/3
≤
(
1− 1
m+ n
)j/6
≤
(
1− 1
6(m+ n)
)j
,
where the second inequality is Bernoulli’s. Setting p = 1/(6(m+ n)), it thus suffices to show
∞∑
j=j∗2+1
jβ−1(1− p)j ≤ (j
∗
2 )
β
(β − 1)n. (64)
Toward this end, first note that whenever j ≥ j∗2 ,
(j + 1)β−1(1− p)j+1
jβ−1(1− p)j =
(
1 +
1
j
)β−1
(1− p) ≤ e(β−1)/j(1− p) < ep(1− p) ≤ 1,
where the first and third inequalities are 1 + x ≤ ex and the second uses (β − 1)/j ≤ p/2 < p by
definition of j∗2 . Thus, the summands in (64) are decreasing, which implies
∞∑
j=j∗2+1
jβ−1(1− p)j ≤
∫ ∞
j=j∗2
jβ−1(1− p)jdj. (65)
To bound the integral, we write∫ ∞
j=j∗2
jβ−1(1− p)jdj = 1
log(1/(1− p))
(
(j∗2 )
β−1(1− p)j∗2 +
∫ ∞
j=j∗2
(β − 1)jβ−2(1− p)jdj
)
≤ 1
p
(
(j∗2 )
β−1(1− p)j∗2 +
∫ ∞
j=j∗2
(β − 1)jβ−2(1− p)jdj
)
=
(j∗2 )
β−1(1− p)j∗2
p
+
∫ ∞
j=j∗2
(β − 1)jβ−2
p
(1− p)jdj,
where the first equality is obtained via integration by parts, the inequality is log(1/x) ≥ 1− x, and
the second equality rearranges the expression. Next, note that by definition of p and j∗2
(β − 1)jβ−2
p
= 6(m+ n)(β − 1)jβ−2 = 1
2
jβ−2 × 12(β − 1)(m+ n) ≤ 1
2
jβ−1 ∀ j ≥ j∗2 .
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Table 1: Average regret at T = 105 relative to the algorithm from [12]
Synthetic data Real data
m K η Uniform Omniscient Uniform Omniscient
10 75 2 0.450± 0.160 0.413± 0.052 0.582± 0.157 0.543± 0.136
10 75 3 0.415± 0.172 0.415± 0.046 0.578± 0.168 0.567± 0.204
10 75 4 0.435± 0.124 0.395± 0.034 0.525± 0.143 0.593± 0.227
10 100 2 0.413± 0.086 0.401± 0.076 0.560± 0.142 0.483± 0.080
10 100 3 0.464± 0.235 0.412± 0.114 0.564± 0.143 0.504± 0.108
10 100 4 0.418± 0.107 0.404± 0.070 0.535± 0.139 0.521± 0.119
15 75 2 0.418± 0.088 0.433± 0.047 0.547± 0.119 0.603± 0.217
15 75 3 0.411± 0.081 0.439± 0.054 0.551± 0.138 0.651± 0.229
15 75 4 0.423± 0.105 0.451± 0.062 0.557± 0.109 0.645± 0.220
15 100 2 0.430± 0.113 0.408± 0.040 0.507± 0.120 0.501± 0.058
15 100 3 0.429± 0.133 0.414± 0.058 0.494± 0.120 0.514± 0.089
15 100 4 0.420± 0.085 0.412± 0.058 0.514± 0.110 0.511± 0.078
Using the previous two inequalities and rearranging, we obtain∫ ∞
j=j∗2
jβ−1(1− p)jdj ≤ 2(j
∗
2 )
β−1(1− p)j∗2
p
≤ (j
∗
2 )
β
(β − 1)n,
where the second inequality uses 1/p = 6(m+ n) ≤ j∗2/(2(β − 1)) and (1− p)j
∗
2 ≤ e−pj∗2 ≤ 1/n,
both of which hold by definition of j∗2 and p. Plugging into (65) completes the proof.
Claim 8. j∗2 ≤ j2, where j∗2 is defined in (51) and
j2 = max{6(m+ n) max{log n, 2(β − 1)}, 3(6η + 2)}.
Proof. By definition of j∗2 , showing j
∗
2 ≤ j2 requires us to show
j2 ≥ 6(m+ n) max{log n, 2(β − 1)}, j2 ≥ 8, j ≥ 3
2
df(j)ηe ∀ j ≥ j2. (66)
The first inequality is immediate. The second holds since j2 > 3(6 + 2) = 24 (since η > 1). For the
third inequality, note that by definition of f(j), dxe ≤ x+ 1, and convexity of x 7→ xη , we have
df(j)ηe =
⌈⌈
2 +
j1/η
2
⌉η⌉
≤ 1 +
(
3 +
j1/η
2
)η
≤ 1 + 6
η
2
+
j
2
.
Therefore, for any j ≥ j2 ≥ 3(6η + 2),
3
2
df(j)ηe ≤ 3(6
η + 2)
4
+
3j
4
≤ j
4
+
3j
4
= j,
so the third inequality in (66) holds.
C Experimental details
In Table 1, we show the average regret 1n
∑n
i=1R
(i)
T (reported as mean ± standard deviation) at
horizon T = 105 relative to the algorithm from [12] for various values of m, K, and η. We use the
same synthetic and real datasets, define the same uniform and omniscient malicious agent strategies,
and choose n = 25, β = 2, α = 4, S = dK/ne as in Section 6.
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